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Clarification ·of the Commission recommendations on the application 
ofthe competition rules to new transport iD.frastructure projects 
1.  AcGelerating the implementation of the trans-European transport network is  one of 
the Community's objectives for developing competitiveness and growth in  Eur_ope. 
Tire High-Level Group on Public-Private Partnership Financing of Trans-European 
Network Transport.Projects has stressed the need to create a legal environment that 
facilitates public-private partnerships. 
2.  Application of the competition  rules  is  often  seen  as  a  factor  of uncertainty that 
impedes  the  investment  of private  capital  into  trans-European  network  transport 
projects at  an  early stage.  This is  because,  in  applying  the competition rules,  the 
specific  features  of each  project  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  and  a 
· case-by-case analysis carried out, in particular where individual exemptions are to be 
granted under Article 85(3). 
3.  So as to ensure that all the parties involved in creating such infrastructures are better 
·informed, the Commission has already presented to the Council  and  the European 
Parliament recommendations on the application of the competition rules to transport 
infrastructure  projects  (see  the  annual  report  drawn  up  in  December 1995, 
COM(95) 571,  published  on 30 May 1996, and in particular Annex II to the chapter 
on the trans-European transport network). 
4.  As a follow-11p  to the conclusions of the High-Level  Group, which underlined the 
usefulness  of ·clarifying  those  recommendations,  the  Commission  in  this 
Communication further explains the application of  the competition rules, in particular 
as regards to: 
the general objectives that are being pursued in this field, 
- the procedure for examining Trans-European network transport projects, 
- the conditions for exemption of  capacity reservation agreements, 
and attempts to reconcile the need to maximise the financial viability of rail  projects 
with the provision offree and non-discriminatory access to infrastructure. The objectives that are being pursued 
5.  In order to promote competitiveness and job-creation, the Commission's policy is to 
ensure effective competition and the development of  intra-Community trade, while at 
the sarrie time ensuring that the measures proposed or adopted are compatible with 
· the tasks in the general economic interest performed by public services. 
6.  The various Community policies relating to the development of competition in  the 
transport sector are interrelated, in particular through implementation of  the principle . 
of freedom to provide services, application of the competition rules laid down in the 
Treaty and the rules governing the award of  contracts. 
7.  Public-private  partnership  projects  must  in  all  cases  take  account  of the  general 
framework provided by the common transport policy and,  as regards rail projects in 
particular,  the Commission's White  Paper published in  December 1992  (COM(92) 
~~- . 
8.  The integration process involved in the establishment of  the single market shapes the 
economic context in which competition policy is applied.  The principle of freedom 
to provide transport services,  laid  down in  the Treaty,  is  implemented through the 
establishment of  the common transport policy. 
9.  For  example,  with  regard  to  railways,  Directive 91/440/EEC  gives  railway 
undertakings and international groupings of railway undertakings,  subject to certain 
conditions,  right  of access  to  Member States'. railway  networks  in  providing 
international  rail  transport  services.  Directive 91/440/EEC  establishes  a  leg~l 
framework within which the rules on competition between undertakings can operate. 
Within  this  legal  framework,  undertakings  can  conclude  agreements,  whose 
lawfulness has to be assessed in the light of  the competition rules. 
10.  A  distinction  should  be  made  here  between  the  competition  rules  and  the . rules 
governing  public  procurement,  which  are  often  confused:  the  Community's 
competition rules as laid down in the Treaty, particularly Articles 85  and 86, do not 
contain  any  specific  provisions  on  procedures  for  calls  for  tenders  in · public 
procurement. 
11.  As  pointed  out  in  the  Commission's  December 1995  annual  report  and  the  final 
report  of the  High-Level  Group  on  Public-Private  Partnership  Financing  of 
Trans-European Network Transport Projects,  two distinct  sets of rules  governing 
public  procurement  apply  at  Community  level  to  transport  infrastructure  work, 
namely Directive 93/37/EEC, which concerns the award of public works contracts, 
and Directive 93/3 8/EEC, which concerns entities operating in the water, electricity, 
transpC'.-: and telecommunications sectors. 
12.  This  Communication  does  not  set  out  to deal  with  the  application  of the  rules 
governing the award of  public works contracts to trans-European network transport 
projects.  It sets out only to clarify the Commission's recommendations regarding the 
application of  the competition rules laid down in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to 
trans~European network transport projects. 
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. practices  (anti-trust),  the  regulated  or  monopoly  sectors  and  state  aid.  The 
Commission  has  a  whole  range  of interdependent  instruments  at  its  disposal  in 
implementing competition policy.  The  rules  governing  restrictive  agreements  and 
abuses of dominant positions, the provisions on merger control and state aid and the 
rules on market liberalisation all  have the saine  objective:  preventing distortions of 
competition within the single market. 
14.  In implementing the Community  competition  rules,  the Commission is  particularly 
vigilant to ensure that firms do not try to neutralise the pro-competitive effects of  the 
. single  market  through  agreements  that  introduce  or maintain  market  partitioning. 
Such  practices  include  certain  types  of vertical  agreements  and/or  distribution 
systems and unjustified refusals to allow third parties non-discriminatory access to 
essential infrastructure. 
15.  The Commission pursues its policy here through· application of the rules governing 
restrictive agreements and  abuses of dominant positions,  i.e.  Articles 85  and  86 of 
the Treaty. 
16.  Article 85  of the Treaty prohibits anti-competitive agreements between firms which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of  competition within the common market. 
17.  However,  this  prohibition may  be  declared  inapplicable to  agreements which  fulfil 
each of  the following four conditions: 
- they  contribute  to  improving  the  production  or  distribution  of goods  or  to 
promoting technical or economic progress; 
- they allow consumers a fair share of  the resulting benefit; 
- they  do  not impose  on  the  undertakings  concerned  resttjctions  which  are  not 
indispensable to the attainment of  these objectives; 
- they do  not afford the undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of  a substantial part of  the products in question. 
18.  Article 86  of the  Treaty  prohibits  any  abuse  by  one  or  more· undertakings  of a 
dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of  it insofar as it 
may  affect trade between MemberStates.  In  contrast to  Article 85  of the Treaty, 
Article 86 does not provide for any exemption from this prohibition. 
19.  The Commission is prepared to help make  more information available to all  parties 
involved in infrastructure projects (the public authorities, transport companies, banks 
and  private  investors).  Project  promoters  are  therefore  invited  to  contact  the 
Commission  if they  require  any  information  and  advice.  The  Commission  will 
examine the projects in full confidentiality.  If  they wish to obtain any information on 
the  competition  rules,  project  leaders  may  contact  Directorate-General IV  in  the 
Commission or the Commission's "One-Stop Help Desk" (fax 32 2 295 65 04). 
20.  Project promoters should also contact their national competition authorities who will 
be able to provide them with all necessary information on the competition rules. 
The procedure for examining projects· 
' 
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Financing of  Trans-European Network Transport Projects stressed the importance of 
a legal environment that encourages the development' of  public-private partnerships. 
22.  In  this  perspective and  in  respecting the  application  of the  competition rules,  the 
Commission takes account of the specific features of each project on. the basis of a 
case-by-case assessment.  · 
23.  A large number of trans-European network transport projects require  participation 
agreements from the outset that bring together a large number of  operators.  Projects 
involving  new  railway  infrastructure  call  for  particular  attention . because  of 
developments  in  the  railways  sector and  the  financing  difficulties  associated  with 
projects having a low level of  profitability. 
24.  Participants in any project requiring large amounts of investment require particular 
legal certainty regarding their commitments as from the very outset of the project. 
This is why  project promoters would like to have the Commission's formal position 
on the eligibility of  their project within a reasonable period of  time. 
25.  The  Commission  departments,  and  in  particular  Directorate-General IV,  which  is 
responsible for competition policy, encourage parties to contact them early on, when 
the project  is  at the discussion  and  planning  stage and  before  any  agreements are 
signed.  This  should  prevent  diffi~ulties  arising  after  the  notification  of the 
agreements and  thereby slowing down the  processing of applications.  It will  also 
ensure that the Commission departments are fully informed about projects from  the 
very  start  and  are  therefore  able  to  process  the  applications  more  rapidly,  in 
particular with a view to ail exemption under Article 85 (3) of  the Treaty. 
26.  So that parties are be able to predict when they can expect to receive a reply from 
the  Commission,  the  latter  in  its  December 1995  recommendations  stated  that  it 
would do its utmost to take a final decision within a maximum period of six months 
of the. notific;ation  of agreements,  provided  the  parties  had  contacted  it  before 
finalising the agreements and  provided that it  had  all  the necessary information for 
assessing the project. 
Reconciling financial profitability and freedom of access to infrastructure 
27.  The  information  obtained  by  the  Commission  from  railway  infrastructure  project 
promoters indicates a number of issues regarding the application of the competition 
rules and the financial profitability of projects.  The main issues are taking account of 
the different competing modes of  transport, the question of  infrastructure access, and 
the prices charged for such access. 
(a)  Taking account of  the different competing modes of  transport 
28.  The in-depth analysis of  a project requires a definition of  the relevan market.  Such a 
definition  naturally  means  that  the  different  modes  of transport  are  taken  into 
account to establish their substitutability or their complementarity (see in  particular 
the Night Services Decision of 21  September 1994, OJ No L 259, 7.10.1994, p. 20, 
points 19 et seq.). 
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29.  Application  of the  competition  rules,· taking  due  account  of the  specific  rules 
applicable· to the  rail  transport  sector,  is  intended  to  prevent  market  partitioning 
through anti-competitive practices such as  unjustified  refusals to allow third parties 
non-discriminatory access to  facilities  which  they  need  in  order to  carry  on  their 
activity. 
30.  A clear distinction should be  drawn between two concepts:  firstly,  the concept of 
freedom of access deriving from the principle of freedom to provide services and, 
secondly, the concept of  capacity reservation agreement for operational requirements 
planned over a reasonable period. 
31.  The issuing of access rights to railway companies is  the responsibility of the public 
authorities, which act in accordance with the Community and national rules in force 
(in  particular,  as  regards  railways,  Article 10  of  Directive 91/440/EEC  and 
Directive 95/19/EC).  One  of the  objectives  of these  provisions  is  to  ensure 
competition and the development of  intra-Commuruty trade without jeopardising the 
public services' performance of  their tasks in the general economic interest. 
32.  The  reservation  of infrastructure  capacity  for  an  operator  providing  transport 
services  planned  in  advance  represents  an  agreement  concl~ded  between  the 
infrastructure  m'anage_r  or the  entity  responsible  for  capacity  allocation  and  the 
transport undertaking.  Any  such  agreement  differs  from  the  issuing  of a right  of 
access by the competent public authority.  Moreover, it may be caught by Article 85 
or Article 86 of  the Treaty. 
33.  In  the consultations  carried  out in  drawing  up  the  Commission's  December 1995 
recommendations  and  the  report  of the  High-Level  Group  on  Public-Private . 
Partnership  Financing  of  Trans-European  Network  Transport  Projects,  the 
participants stressed that the infrastructure manager must be able, if he ·so wishes, to 
reserve at least part of  the capacity for transport companies, which contribute to the 
financial  equilibrium of the  project.  There  is  also  the  question  of the use  of the 
transport equipment purchased by companies which are also project p·romoters~ 
34.  The infrastructure in question requires a high level of  investment, repayable over very 
long  periods,  and  with  a  generally  low  level  of profitability.  Project  promoters · 
should therefore be able to obtain certain guarantees as regards the utilisation of  the 
new infrastructure and the payment of  user charges.  ' 
35.  Project promoters nevertheless recognise that the reservation of  capacity over a long 
period is  contrary to  the principles of freedom  of access  to infrastructure  and of 
competition. 
36.  Where there is congestion on the infrastructure, ,capacity reservation agreements that 
are  not  essential  to  the  operation  of transport  services  may  become  a  means  of 
prohibiting access to  other transport  companies  that  have  the  necessary  rights  of 
access.·  The competition rules do not allow such practices.  It must be ensured that 
specific  agreements  concluded  by  participants  in  an  infrastructure  project  do  not 
prevent infrastructure access  for  transport services authorised  to have  such  access 
under the provisions ofDirective 91/440/EEC and Directive 95/19/EC. 
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transport services or services on separate markets can  f~fHitate the financing of  th~ 
infrastructure  by  ensuring  greater  revenue  from  its  use.  For example,  if several 
transport companies providing freight transport services on one and the same line or 
different transport services such as freight and passenger services are allowed access 
to one and the same rail  infrastructure, this will  mean that a larger number of user 
charges will be paid. 
38.  For  these  reasons,  the  recommendations  put  forward  by  the  Commission  m 
December 1995 are based on the following general criteria: 
(i)  If  an infrastructure operator wishes to give transport companies the opportunity 
of  res~rving capacity from the very start of  the project, this opportunity should 
be offered to all Community undertakings that may be interested. 
(ii)  The capacity reserved for  a company should  be  proportional to the direct or 
indirect  financial  commitments  entered  into  by  that  company  and  should 
correspond to the operational requirements planned over a reasonable period. 
(iii)  A new infrastructure is generally. not congested as soon as soon as it is put into 
service.  A company, or a group of companies within the meaning of Article 3 
of Directive 91/440/EEC,  should  therefore not  have  all  the capacity available 
reserved for it.  Some of the capacity should  remain  available  so  as  to  allow 
competing services to be operated by other companies. 
(iv)  The  companies  aw~ded user  rights  may  not  object  to  these  rights  being 
withdrawn if  they are not used. 
(v)  The duration of capacity reservation agreements must not exceed a reasonable 
period of  time, to be agreed in each particular instance. 
.  39.  These  recommendations  do  not  take  the  place  of case-by-case  assessment  pf 
projects, in accordance_with the procedural rules laid down for this purpose. 
40.  So as to clarifY the scope of  the December 1995 recommendations, it is none the less 
useful to make the following specific points: 
- The recommendations are without prejudice to the rules applicable to the award 
of contracts,  and  in  particular  the  provisions  of Directives 93/37/EEC  and 
93/38/EEC.  Consequently,  they  do  not  create  any  new  obligation  as  regards 
tendering,  but  are  simply  intended  to  make  project  promoters  aware  of the 
advantages of providing prior information to potential users.  Such an  approach 
makes  it  possible  to  attract  the  largest  number  of infrastructure  users  and  to 
dec1 ease the risk of  complaints on the part of  transport operators, who might feel 
discriminated against if  sufficient information were not provided. 
- In  principle,  capacity  reservation  agreements  that  are  justified  by  operational 
requirements do riot pose any difficulty under the competition rules as long as the 
infrastructure is not congested, since no entry barrier is created. 
- If there  is  congestion,  an  agreement  reserving  capacity that is  essential  for  the 
effective  operation of transport services planned  over a  reasonable  period  may 
-6-justify  the  granting  of an  exemption  pursuant  to  Article 85(3),  where  all  the 
conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. 
41.  The purpose of  the recommendations is to inform infrastructure project promoters of 
the need to provide for capacity allocation systems that are sufficiently flexible  over 
time and do not create distortions of competition between users,  while  at the same 
time  safeguarding  over a reasonable  period  the legitimate interests  of each  of the 
users, and in particular those who have supported the project from the outset. 
42.  A  clear  separation  of responsibilities  for  the  allocation  of capacity  may  facilitate 
examination  of notified  projects.  For  example,  the  following  separations  may 
prevent conflicts of  interest as regards capacity allocation: 
the  infrastructure  manager  is  responsible  for  allocating  capacity  on  a 
non-discriminatory basis  and  does not himself operate transport  services  on the 
infrastructure; 
- the manager operates transport services on the infrastructure (or controls users), 
but  an  independent  body  is  responsible  for  allocating  capacity  on  a 
non-discriminatory basis. 
(c)  The prices charged for access to infrastructure 
43.  As regards the prices charged for access to infrastructure, the infrastfUcture manager 
may pursue the aim of  attracting the largest possible number of  users from the outset 
by charging low prices during an initial period.  In principle, the competition rules do 
not oppose any  such  commercial  policy  on  the  part  of the infrastructure manager 
provided  that  the  prices  charged  apply,  over  one  and  the  same  period,  in  a 
non-discriminatory manner to all  competing users.  The competition rules laid down. 
in  the Treaty  do  not  allow  the  application  of dissimilar  conditions  to  equivalent 
transactions,  since  this  creates  distortions  of competition  that  may  affect  trade 
between Member States. 
44.  If project promoters require any further information on these questions, they should 
contact  the  Commission  and,  in  particular,  Directorate-General IV,  which  is 
responsible for competition policy (see point 19). 
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